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also extends the Vlassopoulou recognition of qualifications4' (and not just pro-
fessional experience as now) to those falling under these directives.
Another case, Aranitis,'* has recently given rise to a most significant judgment
on mutual recognition.65 Georgios Aranitis held a Greek diploma, "Ptichiouchos
Geologjkos", which is awarded after four years of university studies in geology. He
had worked as a geologist in Greece for over a decade. He then moved to Berlin
where he wished to carry on working as a geologist. The local employment office in
Berlin classified him as an "unskilled assistant". He challenged this classification,
relying on the general directive on mutual recognition of professional qualifi-
cations. The Arbtitsamt allowed him a literal translation of his Greek title, but
refused to allow him to use the equivalent German qualification Diplom-Geo-
loge.** The main distinction between the Greek and German qualification was the
requirement in Germany of a dissertation." The profession of geologist was not
considered to be regulated in Germany and the German authorities thus con-
sidered that Aranitis was unable to rely on the mutual recognition directive. The
Court agreed, observing that "whether or not a profession is regulated depends on
the legal situation in the host member State and not on the conditions prevailing
on the employment market in that member State".** But the Court went on to
indicate" that Aranitis should, nevertheless, be able to rely on the Vlassopoulou
jurisprudence which it extended to cover qualifications for unregulated occu-
pations which could help holders gain employment. Thus, should an element of
knowledge or ability not be attested to in Aranitis's Greek qualification the Ger-
man authorities could refuse such recognition unless his practical or other aca-
demic experience compensated for the deficit. It seems that the general case law
has been extended to require competent authorities to assess the equivalence of
the academic qualifications and, if missing elements are found, then experience,
knowledge and ability subsequently acquired should be taken into account Con-
fusion over qualifications could be averted by a tag indicating the qualification of
origin.
JULIAN LONBAY*
II. JUSTICE AND HOME AFFAIRS
THE addition of "Justice and Home Affairs" (JHA) to the list of subjects covered
in Current Developments reflects the growing significance of this area of
63. See Lonbay (1992) 41I.C.L.Q. 212,215.
64. Case C-164/94 Georgios Aranitis v. Land Berlin [19%] E.C.R. 1-135.
65. The following analysis follows that used in J. Lonbay, "The Mutual Recognition of
Professional Qualifications in the E C , in Hodgin et aL, Professional Liability: Law and
Insurance (19%) Chap.l.
66. As Advocate General Leger stated, the Directive should not be used to "turn truth
upside down by allowing persons who do not possess a certain diploma to make use of a
diploma which they do not have": supra n.64, at para.45.
67. Report of the bearing: Sitzungsberichi, pp.2-3.1 am grateful to Alex Bosch for trans-
lating this for me.
68. Supra n.64, at para23.
69. Idem, parasJO-32.
* Director of the Institute of European Law, University of Birmingham.
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European law and policy within the overall Treaty framework. In this introduc-
tory note, a brief account is given of the history of co-operation between EU mem-
ber States in JHA matters, culminating in the significant changes announced in the
Treaty of Amsterdam in October 1997. It is a historical record which is marked by
discontinuity and institutional complexity, full justice to which would require
detailed analysis.1 Here we confine ourselves instead to a broad-brush approach,
seeking to highlight the main themes which have characterised JHA co-operation.
In future notes particular areas and issues of current interest will be examined
more closely.
A. Before Maastricht
Prior to the conclusion of the Treaty on European Union (TEU) at Maastricht in
1992 there was no formal recognition of JHA within the EC Treaty framework.
Areas such as policing, criminal justice and immigration tended to be viewed as far
removed from the economic core of Community activity. Further, as home affairs
were traditionally regarded as closely bound up with the security and sovereignty
of the nation State, the possibility of encroachment by a supranational organis-
ation such as the European Community was jealously guarded against3 Yet as
economic integration encouraged closer social and cultural ties across the Com-
munity, the member States increasingly came to view modest co-operation in a
number of JHA matters as mutually beneficial. Because of national sensibilities,
however, such co-operation could only take place in the shadow of the Treaties.
This informal activity may be seen as a series of discrete policy-making threads
which, from the mid-1980s onwards, began to be woven together to form a coher-
ent pattern.3
Two important early initiatives were provided by the Trevi and Schengen sys-
tems. From 1975 onwards, Trevi served as an intergovernmental forum for mem-
ber States to develop common measures, first in respect of counter-terrorism and
latterly concerning drugs, organised crime, police training and technology and a
range of other policing matters.4 Schengen was established with a wider remit but
initially was restricted to a smaller group of States. The initial Schengen Agree-
ment of 19853 paved the way for abolition of border controls between France,
Germany and the Benelux countries. A more detailed Implementation Agree-
ment of 1 990' established a number of related law-enforcement measures includ-
1. See e.g. R. Biebcr and J. Monar (Eds), Justice and Home Affairs in the European
Union (1995); D. Cullen, J. Monar and P. Myers (Eds), Co-operation in Justice and Home
Affairs: An Evaluation of the Third Pillar in Practice (1996); M. Anderson, M. den Boer, P.
Cullen, W. C Gilmore, C D. Raab and N. Walker, Policing The European Union: Theory,
Law and Practice (1995).
2. See N. Walker, "Policing the European Union: The Politics of Transition", in O.
Marenin (Ed.), Policing Change, Changing Police (1996).
3. For a more detailed analysis, see J. Benyon, L. Turnbull, A. Willis, R. Woodward and
A. Beck, Police Co-operation in Europe: An Investigation (1993).
4. Idem, pp.152-167.
5. A text in English is reproduced as an annex to H. Schemers et al (eds). Free Move-
ment of Persons in Europe (1995), pp.547-551.
6. Idem, pp-552-605.
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ing a computerised information system (Schengen Information System) and
police co-operation. More broadly, it made provision for the development of com-
mon policies on asylum and illegal immigration.
Of the many other early developments in JHA co-operation, two stand out.
First, there is immigration and the related matters of asylum and visa policy and
practice. In the 1970s and 1980s there was a running dispute between the Com-
mission and the member States over the competence of the Community to pro-
ceed by supranational means, in particular by means of directives and decisions, as
opposed to the more informal, State-centred method of intergovernmental co-
operation. On the whole, the latter view prevailed, a position reinforced by the
establishment in 1986 of the Ad Hoc Group on Immigration.
Progress within the framework of the Community was also largely frustrated in
the area of judicial co-operation in matters of criminal law. The work of the EC
member States was consistently overshadowed by that of the larger regional
organisation—the Council of Europe, which generated a substantial body of inter-
national criminal legislation in the post-war years.7 A bold plan by Giscard D'Es-
taing in the late 1970s to develop a common "European Judicial Space" across the
Community ultimately foundered on its own excessive ambition, and criminal law
and procedure duly remained outside EC competence. One casualty of this failure
was a more modest intergovernmental steering group—the European Political
Co-operation (EPC) Judicial Co-operation Working Group (JCWG)—although
it was eventually reconstituted in the mid-1980s.
Renewed impetus was given to the activities of a number of these agencies with
the development in 1985 of the Commission's "1992" single market programme. If
its deadline was to be honoured, co-ordination would be required over a wide
range of matters, including the strand of single market policy most closely associ-
ated with JHA—the free movement of persons. As the vehicle of an integrationist
inner core of member States which wished to accelerate progress in this area, the
Schengen system was a direct result of the 1992 initiative. Within the Community
itself, the Co-ordinators Group on the Free Movement of Persons was established
in 1988 to oversee the measures necessary to implement the 1992 programme in
this area.'
The Co-ordinators Group set out its manifesto in the "Palma Document",'
which sought to justify the expansion of Community interest into new areas by
arguing that the effective functioning of the Community post-1992 demanded that
the member States adopt a number of compensatory measures in response to the
anticipated loss of national security consequential upon the abolition of internal
frontier controls. These should include new measures to tackle international ter-
rorism, drug-trafficking and other illegal trade, improved police and judicial co-
operation, and—in pursuit of a strengthened external frontier in lieu of internal
controls—the development of a common visa and of uniform asylum policies.
7. See Anderson a al, op. cti. supra n.l, at cfaap.7.
8. Idem, chap.4.
9. Reproduced as App.5 to the Report of the House of Lords Select Committee on the
European Communities, "1992; Border Controls of People"; Session 1988-89,22nd Report
(HX. Papers 90).
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As well as providing more ambitious terms of reference for existing bodies such
as Trevi and the JCWG, the Palma Document and the political climate which sur-
rounded it also stimulated the development of new forms of co-operation. These
included, most notably, the Mutual Assistance Group 1992 (MAG 92), which ad-
dressed the implications of free movement for European customs agencies, and
the European Committee to Combat Drugs (CELAD), established in 1990 to
develop and co-ordinate preventive and repressive anti-drugs strategies among
member States.
B. The Third Pillar
The Treaty on European Union (TEU) accorded formal recognition to this bur-
geoning area of activity by providing a separate title on co-operation in Justice and
Home Affairs. This quickly became know as the third pillar, in recognition of the
fact that the Treaty structure now encompassed not only the central (or first) pillar
of European Community law, but also two flanking pillars dealing with Common
Foreign and Security Policy (second pillar) and JHA respectively.
The third pillar sought to integrate the various areas of JHA co-operation and
the various levels of personnel through an elaborate structure, spanning five lev-
els. At the apex is the Justice and Home Affairs Council, which comprises minis-
ters from the member States and which acts as the supreme policy-making body.
Situated immediately below the JHA Council is COREPER, where permanent
representatives from the member States negotiate and agree agendas on behalf of
JHA ministers. Below these two familiar Community organs lies the K4 Com-
mittee, which is the direct institutional successor to the Co-ordinators Group. The
K4 Committee has in turn generated a network of sub-groups which provide the
fourth and fifth levels of the hierarchy. Three comitis directeurs (CDs) report to
K4. CD I is concerned with immigration and asylum, absorbing the functions of
the pre-Maastricht Ad Hoc Group on Immigration. CD II is concerned with police
and customs co-operation, replacing Trevi and extending the MAG initiative. CD
III is concerned with judicial co-operation of a criminal and civil nature, taking
over the work of the JCWG. Finally, each steering group has a number of sub-
committees, or working groups, which have emerged gradually since the basic
framework was put in place. These working groups presently number around 20,
ranging from general flagship concerns, such as terrorism, police co-operation and
external frontiers, to more detailed policy areas such as false travel documents and
the international enforcement of driving disqualifications.10
These structural arrangements are a peculiar hybrid, reflecting continuing
ambivalence about the appropriate degree of international control over internal
security matters. They are not "pure intergovernmental co-operation"," since
Community institutions are involved at a number of points; but neither are they
part of EC law in the same way as the first pillar, since the Community continues to
lack direct legislative competence in JHA matters and, more generally, the bal-
ance of influence between Community institutions and members States in the pol-
icy process continues to favour the latter.
10. For more detailed analysis see Anderson etaL,op.dL supra n.l, at chap.2.
11. D. O'Keefe, -Recasting the Third Pillar" (1995) 32 CMJ.R. 893,902.
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In the absence of any direct legislative competence, the Council nevertheless
has various types of decision-making authority under the third pillar, namely joint
positions, joint actions and conventions.12 While the development of such instru-
ments is an important advance, doubts remain over their efficacy. Joint positions
and joint actions mirror the position under the second pillar (Foreign and Security
Policy), but are less obviously suited to a domain which by its nature requires
"legislative action rather than external posture"." Further, they are subject to the
requirement of Council unanimity, thereby ensuring that progress can be made
only at the pace of the most reluctant member State. Third pillar conventions
occupy the firmer legal ground of classical public international law, but they
require not only unanimity within the Council but also ratification by all member
States in accordance with their domestic constitutional requirements. Such a
"double-lock" procedure represents a formidable obstacle. Finally, thepassarelle
provision, which allows a transfer of competence from third to first pillar in respect
of the majority of JHA matters, offers opportunities for effective EU enactments,
but it too is guarded by the double-lock.14
A similarly mixed picture emerges from an examination of the relevant institu-
tional competences. The Commission "shall be fully associated with" the work of
the third pillar. Yet in contrast to its role under the first pillar, the Commission
does not enjoy exclusive power of initiative. Instead, it shares this right with the
member States in most areas and, as regards judicial co-operation in criminal mat-
ters, customs co-operation and police co-operation, it has no right of initiative
whatsoever.15 The European Parliament is consulted on "principal aspects of
[JHA] activities", yet, while it may also ask questions of the Council and make
recommendations to it,16 the Parliament lacks the significant role in the law-mak-
ing process and in the monitoring of executive power which it has gradually
acquired under the first pillar. As for the Court of Justice, it has no inherent juris-
diction under the third pillar, but it may be given powers under specific third pillar
conventions to interpret their provisions and rule on disputes." So far, however,
the vesting of jurisdiction in the Court under particular conventions has proved
deeply controversial and has led to delays in their ratification and
implementation.w
While it marks a qualitative shift from the informality of the pre-Maastricht era,
the third pillar has tended to attract two kinds of criticism. On the one hand, it has
been criticised as ineffectual; as an unduly complex and cumbersome framework
12. Art.KJ(2) TEU.
13. J. Monar. "European Union—Justice and Home Affaire A Balance Sheet and an
Agenda for Reform", in G. Edwards and A. Pijpers (Eds), The Politics of European Treaty
Reform: The 1996 Intergovernmental Conference and Beyond (1997), pp326-339, at p330.
14. ATLK.9TEU.
15. ArtK.4(2) TEU.
16. ATLK.6TEU.
17. ArtJC3{2) TEU.
18. The most controversial example to date has been the Europol Convention (1995) O J.
C316. After its conclusion in July 1995. ratification and implementation were delayed pend-
ing an agreement on the role of the ECJ. When the matter was finally resolved in the form of
a Protocol to the European Convention in July 1996, it effectively took the form of an agree-
ment to differ, with each high contracting party retaining the option to accept the jurisdiction
of the ECJ to interpret the Convention by means of a declaration to that effect.
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whose early record suggests that it will be unable to deliver significant results. In
particular, it is claimed that progress on the conclusion and ratification of conven-
tions—the highest legal instrument under the third pillar—has been slow and
uneven; and as regards other less formal decision-making mechanisms, although
joint actions have become increasingly popular, joint positions have been almost
entirely neglected, and there has been a tendency to fall back instead upon classi-
cal non-binding measures of intergovernmental action such as resolutions, state-
ments and conclusions." On the other hand, the third pillar has also been criticised
as being unduly authoritarian in its policy orientation. On this view, it has demon-
strated an excessive concern with repressive instruments of security and order.
Arguably, these two criticisms have a common root in the continuing preoccu-
pation of member States with the retention of sovereignty in JH A matters. If the
third pillar is cumbersome and slow, it is at least in part because the reluctance to
move towards taking decisions by majority votes leads to progress within the third
pillar being determined by the most cautious member State. Equally, if the third
pillar is unduly committed to a narrow security perspective, it is because sover-
eignty concerns continue to militate against the full involvement of supranational
institutions, like the Parliament and the Court of Justice, no matter how well
placed they may be to check and monitor third pillar activities and safeguard indi-
vidual freedoms.2"
C. "Maastricht II"—The Amsterdam Treaty
These criticisms gained momentum during the period leading up to the 1996 Inter-
Governmental Conference (IGC), with all the European institutions, including
the normally sceptical Council, admitting that there was a case for greater involve-
ment of EC institutions to improve effectiveness and accountability.21 These con-
cerns were crystallised in the Reflection Group report of December 1995 which
served as the agenda for the IGC, and ultimately, in the Treaty of Amsterdam
itself.
The Treaty, when ratified, will undoubtedly signal a new step towards the inte-
gration of JHA matters within the mainstream of European law. However,
because of continuing disagreement between member States as to the speed and
direction of JHA activity, the legislative strategy chosen to bring about this further
integration is marked by complexity and qualification. Under the umbrella of a
new chapter on the so-called "area of freedom, security and justice"22 are to be
found both a new EC Treaty Title on visas, asylum, immigration and other policies
related to free movement of persons23 and a revised and streamlined Title VI of the
TEU covering police and customs co-operation and judicial co-operation in crimi-
19. See e.g. Monar, op. at supra n.13: B. Meyring, "Intergovernmentalism and Supra-
nationality: Two Stereotypes for a Complex Reality" (1997) E.l_Rev. 221.
20. See e.g. D. Bigo, "The European Internal Security Field", in M. Anderson and M. den
Boer (Eds), Policing Across National Boundaries (1994), pp.161-173; M. Spencer, Stales of
Injustice: A Guide to Human Rights and Civil Liberties in the European Union (1995).
21. See Monar, op. at. supra n.13.
22. The present note refers only briefly to the relevant provisions of the new Treaty. A
more detailed analysis of these provisions in so far as they relate to the free movement of
persons will be provided in a subsequent note by Julian Lombay.
23. New Title Ilia, Art73i-q.
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nal matters. Accordingly, JHA matters no longer have a single Treaty source, but
now straddle the first and third pillars. Superimposed upon this dual structure is
the incorporation of the entire Schengen acquis.1* This represents a significant pol-
itical victory for the Schengen system and its expanding membership, which now
includes all EU member States except the United Kingdom and Ireland, together
with Norway and Iceland as associate members.
In turn, this new JHA system will allow for flexibility and a wide variety of
involvement by member States. The United Kingdom and Ireland are allowed to
maintain their existing border controls,23 and need take no part in the adoption by
the Council of measures pursuant to the new EC Title on free movement, asylum
and immigration.26 Equally, they may opt out of those existing or new parts of the
Schengen acquis which fall within the third pillar.27 Denmark is not required to
adopt those parts of the Schengen acquis which are determined to be part of the
new EC Title, although it has no such exemption in respect of those part of the
Schengen acquis which fall within the third pillar.28 There are also flexible arrange-
ments for Iceland and Norway, which are to be involved in the deliberations of the
JHA Council and be bound by its decisions, but only in matters, under either first
or third pillar, which form part of the Schengen acquis." Finally, in addition to
these particular provisions, the new third pillar strengthens the facility in the
Maastricht Treaty for any number of member States to "establish closer co-oper-
ation" on any matter.*
Arguably, the new arrangements go some way to increasing both the efficiency
and the accountability of JHA co-operation. Matters which were previously
located within the third pillar or within Schengen have been transferred to the first
pillar, so that majority voting and parliamentary and judicial supervision associ-
ated with the latter will now be available. Even within the streamlined third pillar,
there is some strengthening of the role of the EC institutions. The consultative role
of the Parliament is clarified-" in respect of conventions and two other new policy
instruments under the draft Treaty—"framework decisions" made "for the pur-
pose of approximation of the laws and regulations of the Member States" and
other non-legislative "decisions";32 the power of the Commission to initiate
decision-taking is extended to all third pillar matters;" and for the first time gen-
eral provision is made for the jurisdiction of the Court (a) to give preliminary
rulings on the interpretation of conventions and on the validity and interpretation
24. Protocol Integrating the Schengen Acquis Into the Framework of the European
Union.
25. Protocol on the Application of Certain Aspects of Article 7a of the Treaty Estab-
lishing the European Community to the United Kingdom and to Ireland.
26. Protocol on the Position of the United Kingdom and Ireland.
27. Protocol, supra n.24, Arts.4-5.
28. Protocol on the Position of Denmark.
29. Protocol, supra n.24, Art.6.
30. The further development of this provision under the Amsterdam Treaty, replacing the
existing Art.K.7 with new Arts. 12, IS and 16 TEU, allows member States to make use of
Community mechanisms, institutions and procedures in the furtherance of co-operation.
31. NewArtKl lTEU.
32. Under the new Treaty, joint actions and joint positions are both abolished, to be
replaced by framework decisions, decisions, and common positions; see new Art.K.6 TEU.
33. NewArLK6TEU.
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of measures implementing them, and also of the new decisions and framework
decisions (albeit this jurisdiction does not apply in respect of any member State
until it has made a declaration accepting it); (b) to review the legality of framework
decisions and decisions in actions brought by a member State or the Commission;
and (c) to rule on disputes between member States or between member States and
the Commission on the application of the various policy instruments.*4
Whatever progress there has been, however, has been at the cost of uniformity.
In the words of one commentator, the new institutional landscape is "frighteningly
indeterminate",13 and this may cause problems which outweigh the benefits of par-
tial transfer to the first pillar and strengthening of the residual third pillar. The
benefits of a co-ordinated approach across member States and the various JHA
policy sectors (which was one of the main arguments for the introduction of the
third pillar at Maastricht) are endangered by the introduction of variable
geometry within the Treaty framework. The membership of JHA Council and its
supporting bureaucracy and operations will be constituted differently for different
tasks with no guarantee that its various strategic agendas or policy initiatives will
be mutually complementary. Even within particular policy fields, the right of indi-
vidual member States to refuse the jurisdiction of the Court suggests that tensions
and conflict over the terms of co-operation may emerge. Further, increased insti-
tutional complexity may make the already intricate system of JHA co-operation
even less transparent and less easily understood by the European public, and so
less amenable to genuine democratic involvement and accountability.
Of course, this is not to deny that some variable geometry was required at
Amsterdam if member States ideologically divided over the acceptable limits of
further integration were to avail themselves of mechanisms for deepening their
commitment to joint action wherever the will existed. Neither should the possi-
bility be dismissed that measures currently taken by the integrationist core will set
a standard to which all member States will aspire in due course. In the shorter
term, however, as regards the likelihood of its increasing co-operative efficiency
and democratic responsiveness in JHA matters, "one step forward and two steps
backward" would appear to be the verdict on the new Treaty.
NEIL WALKER*
34. NewArtK.7TEU.
35. Professor Dierdre Curtin, in a lecture to the Annual Congress of the Academy on
European Law in Trier, 20 June 1997; quoted in Statewatch, VoL7, N o 3 (May-June, 1997),
p.18.
• Professor of Legal and Constitutional Theory, University of Aberdeen.
